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Abstract 
 
The majority of human neuroscience research has focussed on understanding functional 
organisation within segregated patches of cortex. The ventral visual stream has been 
associated with the detection of physical features such as faces and body parts, whereas the 
theory-of-mind network has been associated with making inferences about mental states and 
underlying character, such as whether someone is friendly, selfish, or generous. To date, 
however, it is largely unknown how such distinct processing components integrate neural 
signals. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging and connectivity analyses, we 
investigated the contribution of functional integration to social perception. During scanning, 
participants observed bodies that had previously been associated with trait-based or neutral 
information. Additionally, we independently localised the body perception and ToM 
networks. We demonstrate that when observing someone who cues the recall of stored social 
knowledge compared to non-social knowledge, a node in the ventral visual stream 
(extrastriate body area) shows greater coupling with part of the theory-of-mind network 
(temporal pole). These results show that functional connections provide an interface between 
perceptual and inferential processing components, thus providing neurobiological evidence 
that supports the view that understanding the visual environment involves interplay between 
conceptual knowledge and perceptual processing. 
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Introduction 
Segregation and integration are cornerstones of brain organisation (Sporns 2013). The 
majority of human neuroimaging research has focussed on functional segregation by 
identifying distinct patches of cortex with particular functional properties (Fox and Friston 
2012). For example, in the domain of social perception, anatomically and functionally distinct 
neural circuits have been associated with recognising and making inferences about others, 
respectively (van Overwalle 2009; Kanwisher 2010). Little is currently known, however, 
regarding how signals from such distributed neural circuits are integrated (Kanwisher 2010; 
Sporns 2014). The current fMRI experiment investigates the contribution of functional 
integration to social perception. 
Over the last 20 years, evidence has supported the view that segregated neural circuits 
underpin distinct social processes (Adolphs 2009). The detection and recognition of other 
human agents on the basis of their physical features (body perception) engages patches of 
cortex along the ventral visual stream, including occipitotemporal cortices and fusiform gyri 
(Kanwisher 2010). In addition, person knowledge research has identified a brain network that 
is engaged when representing others’ mental states, such as beliefs, desires, and attitudes, 
which is known as the Theory of Mind (ToM) network (Frith and Frith 1999; Saxe and 
Kanwisher 2003; Mitchell 2009; van Overwalle et al. 2009). The ToM-network comprises 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporal poles, and 
precuneus, and has been shown to be active when inferring traits, such as whether someone is 
helpful or selfish (Ma et al. 2011). Together, both body perception and ToM processes have 
been argued to form a network that contributes to understanding who someone is and how we 
might expect them to behave (Haxby et al. 2000). 
Within a network model framework, body perception and ToM networks can be 
considered as distinct processing components, which are linked together by anatomical and 
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functional connections (Meunier et al. 2010; Park and Friston 2013; Sporns 2013). Each 
component in a network would perform functionally distinct processes with connections 
serving to integrate signals across components (Sporns 2014). Although network models of 
brain function are supported by research in comparative, theoretical and systems biology 
(Meunier et al. 2010; Sporns 2010; Bassett and Gazzaniga 2011; Wig et al. 2011), empirical 
evidence demonstrating how and when neural circuits communicate is limited. Indeed, by 
measuring the magnitude of regional brain responses the ventral visual stream and ToM 
networks have been associated with linking together physical features of a person with social 
knowledge (Todorov et al. 2007; Vrtička et al. 2009; Bayliss et al. 2012). It remains largely 
unknown, however, the extent to which these distinct neural networks communicate during 
body perception. 
To date, one prior neuroimaging study has shown that body perception and ToM 
networks interact with each other when associating trait-based information with a person’s 
body shape and posture (Greven et al. 2016). Greven and colleagues (2016) paired bodies or 
names with trait-based or neutral statements and asked participants to form an impression of 
each person. The results showed that body perception and ToM networks interact when 
linking physical features to personality characteristics and that this effect was tied to 
processing bodies more than names. More specifically, right fusiform body area (FBA) 
showed more coupling with bilateral temporal poles and left TPJ, while left temporal pole 
showed more coupling with left FBA, for traits than neutral statements and for bodies more 
than names. Thus, during an initial acquaintance, linking trait inferences with physical 
features involves integration between nodes within the body perception and ToM networks. 
The temporal poles have previously been implicated with binding complex information from 
different modalities together (Olson et al. 2007, 2013), as well as retrieving social knowledge 
(Simmons and Martin 2009; Simmons et al. 2010; Drane et al. 2013). Therefore, Greven and 
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colleagues’ (2016) findings enhance functional understanding of the temporal poles by 
showing how they operate in partnership with the body perception network to integrate 
distinct pieces of social information such as body shape and trait information. 
Social interactions, however, are not only guided by information received online; we 
frequently have stored knowledge regarding our interactions partners (Todorov et al. 2007; 
Vrtička et al. 2009; Cloutier et al. 2011). It is important to study recall of social knowledge 
because physical features not only cue identity judgments (Haxby et al. 2000; Or and Wilson 
2010; O’Toole et al. 2011), but also trait inferences that also guide social behaviour (e.g., 
helpful, selfish; Uleman et al. 2008; Sugiura 2014). Prior neuroimaging work has investigated 
recall of social knowledge during face perception (Todorov et al. 2007; Vrtička et al. 2009; 
Bayliss et al. 2012), but this work did not assess functional connectivity between neural 
networks and instead measured the magnitude of responses. These studies showed that areas 
within face perception and ToM networks are involved when observing faces about which 
behaviours had been remembered compared to novel faces (Todorov et al. 2007), or when 
recognising faces that previously appeared hostile compared to friendly faces (Vrtička et al. 
2009). To date, therefore, it has yet to be explored how functional connectivity between 
representations of physical features (face or body perception) and trait-inferences contribute 
to the recall of trait information during person perception. 
The current fMRI study uses functional connectivity analyses to investigate the 
hypothesis that recall of social knowledge during person perception involves the exchange 
and integration of signals between the ventral visual stream and the ToM-network. Based on 
prior studies, we expect the temporal poles to be a key candidate for storing social knowledge 
(for reviews, see Olson et al. 2007; Patterson et al. 2007; Perrodin et al. 2015). In addition, we 
will be able to test the extent to which recall of social knowledge engages similar neural 
network integration as previously shown during the association of social knowledge to body 
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shape and posture (Greven et al. 2016). For a similar pattern of results to Greven and 
colleagues (2016), we should expect links between the temporal poles and FBA when 
recalling social over non-social information. 
 
Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants (15 females; mean ± SD age: 22.6 ± 4.7 years) were 
recruited from the Bangor community and received a monetary reimbursement of £15 for 
completing the fMRI experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and reported no history of neurological damage. They gave informed consent according to the 
local ethics guidelines. For 3 participants, 2 sessions from the main task had to be removed 
due to excessive head motion (displacement above 3 mm). Due to a technical error during 
post-scanning behavioural data collection one participant’s data was not recorded and 
therefore the post-scanning behavioural data is based on a sample of twenty-three participants 
(14 females; mean ± SD age: 22.6 ± 4.8 years). Stimuli were selected and validated for the 
fMRI experiment in a behavioural pilot experiment. The behavioural pilot experiment 
involved 73 participants (55 females; mean ± SD age: 20 ± 2.9 years). No participants 
completed both pilot and fMRI experiments. 
 
Experimental design overview 
The full experimental design comprised a 3 (Social knowledge: Positive, Negative, 
Neutral) x 2 (Group bias: in-group, out-group) factorial design. In order to study the recall of 
social knowledge, the current study collapsed the design across Group bias. All analyses in 
the current experiment, therefore, focus on recall of trait-based information (Positive and 
Negative combined) compared to neutral information (Neutral) irrespective of group bias. 
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Analyses investigating the effect of group bias will be reported elsewhere (Greven & Ramsey, 
under review). 
The task and stimuli were first piloted for validation purposes, in order to establish 
that participants could encode social information with specific bodies and later accurately 
recall that knowledge when prompted. Subsequently, the fMRI experiment consisted of 
several stages (Figure 1): 1) Encoding phase – participants were asked to form an impression 
about unique body-statement pairs; 2) fMRI experiment – participants were shown each body 
again and asked to form an impression of them based on what they had previously learnt; 3) 
Recognition phase – participants had to judge which of the two bodies presented in each trial 
was previously paired with the shown statement. Details of each stage of the experiment and 
the tasks employed are provided below. 
 
Stimuli 
Pictures of bodies were adapted from Greven et al. (2016) that had been selected to 
convey an emotionally-neutral posture (i.e., crossed-arms or slouching postures were not 
included) but varied in terms of body shape, skin colour and clothing. Consistent with prior 
work (Downing et al. 2007), in order to target regions selective for images of bodies and not 
faces, images had been cropped so the head was not visible. For the pre-scanning experiment, 
a total of 144 bodies (72 female) were used. Two versions of each body were created using 
GIMP 2.8 software (www.gimp.org), one with a blue shirt and one with a yellow shirt. Blue 
and yellow clothing was required for analyses of group bias, but are not the focus of the 
current study. Participants would never see the same body in both a yellow and a blue shirt. 
Instead, half the participants would see bodies 1 – 72 in blue and 73 – 144 in yellow, and the 
other participants would see the opposite combination. Each body was only shown once 
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during the encoding experiment, to avoid any possible effects of combining the same person 
with different social knowledge statements over the course of the experiment. 
Social knowledge stimuli comprised 144 statements that were adapted from Mitchell 
et al. (2006) to convey either trait-based (positive and negative) or neutral information. An 
example of a trait-implying statement is “He cut in front of the man in line”, implying the 
person is inconsiderate, whereas a neutral example is “She walked through the swivel doors”. 
Each statement (48 Positive, 48 Negative, 48 Neutral) was presented once during the 
experiment. 
 
Behavioural tasks 
Encoding phase: Participants were assigned to one of two different groups (Blue or 
Yellow) and wore a t-shirt of that colour for the remainder of the experiment. This t-shirt 
manipulation was part of the group bias investigation. Participants were told that they would 
see lots of different bodies about whom they would learn something, and later on they would 
be asked a number of questions about the bodies. In each trial, participants were presented 
concurrently with a picture of a body wearing a blue or yellow t-shirt and a social knowledge 
statement (Positive, Negative or Neutral). For each participant, bodies were randomly 
assigned to the statements. Thus, there was no systematic relationship between particular 
bodies and statements across participants, which removes any coupling between low-level 
stimulus artefacts and any one condition in our design. 
The body (full-colour picture, 300 x 750 pixels) was presented in the middle of the 
screen with text (fontsize 30 pt) underneath (250 pixels below the centre of the screen). Each 
trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 ms, followed by the simultaneous 
presentation of an agent and a statement for 5000 ms. Participants were instructed to pay 
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attention to both the person as well as to the knowledge that they would receive about that 
person (Traits or Neutral). 
There were 144 trials in the encoding phase (48 per condition; Positive, Negative, and 
Neutral). Trials were presented in 8 blocks containing a random sequence of 18 trials from 3 
valence conditions. Blocks alternated between a presentation of team yellow and team blue. 
To make sure participants paid attention to all aspects of the stimuli, at the end of each block 
they were asked a yes/no-question about the previous trial. Within a maximum duration of 5 
seconds, yes/no responses were made by pressing the ‘F’ and ‘J’ button, respectively. These 
questions could be about the agent’s gender (was this person a man/woman?), or body (was 
this person facing forward?), as well as the person knowledge statements (did this person 
touch an object? did this person have a positive/negative attitude?). To ensure that participants 
remained alert to all elements of these stimuli, the content of questions could not be predicted. 
fMRI scanning: Shortly after finishing the encoding phase (approximately 5 minutes), 
participants entered the scanner. Here, all the bodies were presented again. Participants were 
instructed to form an impression of these people based on what they previously learned about 
them. More details on fMRI scanning procedures are given below. 
Recognition phase: After completing all tasks in the scanner, participants performed a 
recognition task where all the bodies and statements were presented again. In each trial, two 
bodies appeared on the screen (both of the same team and gender) and a statement was shown 
underneath the bodies. On all trials, one of the two bodies had been previously paired with 
that specific statement during the encoding phase. Therefore, on every trial one body correctly 
matched the statement and one did not. Across trials the pairing of bodies varied such that 
either both bodies were previously paired with a trait-based statement (positive or negative) or 
both bodies were paired with a neutral statement, or one body was previously paired with a 
trait and the other body with a neutral statement. During this task, each body was presented 
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twice, once as the body that had been paired with the statement and once as the body that had 
been paired with a different statement. There were two conditions: Traits and Neutral. For 
Traits, the correct answer was a body that was previously paired with a trait. On neutral trials, 
the correct answer was a body that was previously paired with neutral information. 
Behavioural data analysis 
A trial was considered an outlier if the reaction time was below 200 ms, ensuring that 
participants had taken enough time to read the statement and observe the bodies. This resulted 
in no rejected trials in the pilot experiment, and 0.94% of trials rejected in data collection after 
scanning. Participants’ recognition performance (percentage accurate) was compared against 
chance performance (50%) for Traits and Neutral conditions, as well as across the two 
conditions. To do so, 95% mean differences and confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated 
for each condition compared to 50% as well as compared to each other. In addition, Cohen’s 
dz was calculated as a standardised effect size by dividing the mean difference by the standard 
deviation of the difference (Cohen 1992; Lakens 2013; Cumming 2014). 
 
fMRI experiment: During scanning, three tasks were completed (the main 
experimental task, a body-localiser and a Theory-of-Mind (ToM) localiser). Details for each 
individual task are provided below. 
Main experimental task. The main task used a block-design with blocks of bodies 
presented for 16 seconds. Each image (300 x 650 pixels) was presented for 1800 ms, followed 
by a blank screen for 200 ms, resulting in a total of 8 bodies per block. The same bodies 
presented in the encoding task were now presented during scanning and grouped together in a 
block according to their assigned social knowledge (positive, negative, and neutral). For 
example, in a ‘positive’ block, all 8 bodies were previously associated with positive social 
information. Participants were given the instruction to form an impression of each body, 
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based on the information they learned about that body during the encoding phase. At the end 
of each block, participants were asked a question about the previous body relating to their 
gender (was this person a woman/man?) or their team (was this person part of your/other 
team?). From trial-to-trial, the image location was slightly jittered (4 different locations that 
varied by 10 pixels around a central fixation dot). From the four options, the location of the 
image on each trial was randomly selected. 
In one functional run, 20 blocks were completed and blocks were separated by a 
jittered rest block with an average duration of 7 seconds (which varied between 5 and 9 
seconds with 500 ms steps). Each of the 20 blocks showed bodies from one condition 
(Positive, Negative, or Neutral). The complete set of 20 blocks were split into two sets of 10 
blocks with each set of 10 blocks pseudorandomised. Indeed, to help effectively model the 
influence of different events on BOLD signal, block order for the first and second sequence of 
10 blocks was counterbalanced so that within each sequence, each condition was preceded 
equally often by all conditions (Josephs and Henson 1999; Wager and Nichols 2003; Aguirre 
2007). To provide a completely balanced block “history” across conditions, each sequence 
began with a “starter block”, which was not included in the data analysis but modelled as a 
covariate of no interest. Subsequently, three further blocks from each condition were 
presented in a counterbalanced manner. This resulted in 6 blocks of each condition (Positive, 
Negative, and Neutral) within one run. Each participant completed 4 functional runs of this 
task, with 24 Positive, 24 Negative and 24 Neutral blocks across the experiment for a total of 
192 trials per condition. For all subsequent analyses, we combine Positive and Negative into a 
Traits condition, which therefore has 192*2 = 384 trials. 
Functional localisers: To localise body-selective brain regions we used an established 
paradigm (Downing et al., 2007; http://pages.bangor.ac.uk/~pss811/page7/page7.html). We 
presented 12-sec blocks of cars and of whole bodies (without heads). A run started with a 
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blank screen for 14 seconds, followed by two alternations of each condition. This was 
repeated a second time, and followed by a final rest period of 14 seconds. Each image was 
presented for 600 ms, followed by a blank screen for 100 ms. Twice during each block, the 
same image was presented two times in a row. Participants had to press a button whenever 
they detected this immediate repetition (1-back task). The image location was slightly jittered 
in the same way as in the main task. Each participant completed two runs of this task, 
counterbalancing the order of the stimulus presentation (Bodies or Cars). 
To localise brain regions that respond to mental state reasoning, we used an 
established ToM-localiser (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; http://saxelab.mit.edu/superloc.php). 
Participants read 10 short false belief stories, in which the belief characters have about the 
state of the world is false. Participants also read 10 false photograph stories, where a 
photograph, map, or sign has out-dated or misleading information. After reading each story, 
participants had to answer whether the subsequently presented statement is true or false. Each 
run started with a 12 second rest period, after which the stories and questions were presented 
for 14 seconds combined (stories: 10 seconds; questions: 4 seconds), and were separated by a 
12 second rest period. The order of items and conditions is identical for each participant. In 
the first run, stimuli 1 – 5 from each condition were presented, and the remaining stimuli were 
presented during the second run. 
 
Data Acquisition 
The experiment was conducted on a 3 Tesla scanner (Philips Achieva), equipped with 
a 32-channel SENSE-head coil. Stimuli were displayed on a MR safe BOLD screen 
(Cambridge Research Systems: http://www.crsltd.com/) behind the scanner, which 
participants viewed via a mirror mounted on the head-coil. T2*-weighted functional images 
were acquired using a gradient echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence. An acquisition time 
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of 2000 ms was used (image resolution: 3.03 x 3.03 x 4 mm3, TE = 30, flip angle = 90°). 
After the functional runs were completed, a high-resolution T1-weighted structural image was 
acquired for each participant (voxel size = 1 mm3, TE = 3.8 ms, flip angle = 8°, FoV = 288 × 
232 × 175 mm3). Four dummy scans (4 * 2000 ms) were routinely acquired at the start of 
each functional run and were excluded from analysis. 
 
Data preprocessing and analysis 
Data were preprocessed and analysed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Department of 
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK: www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/). Functional images were 
realigned, unwarped, corrected for slice timing, and normalized to the MNI template with a 
resolution of 3x3x3 mm and spatially smoothed using an 8 mm smoothing kernel. Head 
motion was examined for each functional run and a run was not analysed further if 
displacement across the scan exceeded 3 millimetres. 
Univariate model and analysis: Each condition was modelled from the onset of the 
first body for a duration of 16 seconds. A design matrix was fitted for each participant with 
three regressors in total: one for bodies associated with social knowledge (Traits), one for 
bodies associated with neutral information (Neutral), and one for the starter blocks (Starter). 
Positive and Negative statements were combined into one Trait regressor in order to target our 
primary hypothesis. There is clear justification for hypothesising a link between person 
perception and Theory-of-Mind networks for the Traits > Neutral contrast. Indeed, prior 
research has shown that reading trait-diagnostic compared to trait-neutral statements engages 
the ToM network (e.g., Ma et al., 2011) and images of bodies engage the body network 
(Downing et al., 2001). Therefore, our hypothesis follows that combining the two (traits and 
bodies) may involve exchange signals between the two networks, which may be achieved 
through functional integration (connectivity). However, we do not have the same rationale for 
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expecting integration between person perception and Theory-of-mind networks depending on 
the valence of information (positive vs. negative trait statements). As such, we do not perform 
analyses based on valence because we do not have any hypotheses regarding the functionality 
of body and ToM networks according to valence of trait information. 
The main effect of social knowledge (Traits > Neutral) was evaluated for each 
participant individually (first-level), and then for the group (second-level). This univariate 
analysis served two functions. As our primary research question could only be addressed by 
functional connectivity analyses, the first function of univariate analysis was to identify seed 
regions for subsequent connectivity-based analyses. The second function enabled the test of 
magnitude-based hypotheses regarding the role of body perception and ToM network 
engagement when recalling social information from bodies. That is, we will be able to test if 
both body and ToM networks are preferentially involved when visually processing bodies 
about which trait-based information could be recalled compared to neutral bodies. 
For the body and ToM localiser, a design matrix was fitted for each participant with 2 
regressors, one for each condition (bodies and cars; false beliefs and false photographs). 
Body-selective regions were revealed by contrasting bodies and cars (Bodies > Cars). The 
ToM-network was revealed by contrasting false beliefs with false photographs (False Beliefs 
> False Photographs). 
Psychophysiological Interaction analysis: Our primary hypothesis was that recalling 
social information about bodies involved functional coupling between distributed neural 
circuits. Specifically, coupling was predicted between body-selective patches in the ventral 
visual stream and the ToM-network. To test this hypothesis, we used psychophysiological 
interaction (PPI) analysis (Friston et al. 1997). PPI enables the identification of brain regions 
whose activity correlates with the activity of a seed region as a function of a task. Here we 
used a generalized form of PPI, which allows for comparisons across the complete design 
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space (McLaren et al. 2012). By doing so, it is possible to see whether any voxels across the 
brain show a correlation with activity in the seed region (the “physiological” element) as a 
function of the two conditions within the main task (the “psychological” element) (Figure 
2B). 
Two steps were taken to define seed regions for the PPI analysis. First, based on the 
group-level univariate analysis, we identified any clusters of overlap between the Traits > 
Neutral contrast and the functional localisers (i.e., body and/or ToM localiser) at the group-
level. This group-level analysis can identify clusters showing body or ToM selectivity as well 
as sensitivity to the main task’s contrast. Second, if clusters of overlap were identified at the 
group-level, we identified participant-specific coordinates for regions of overlap at the single-
participant level, thus allowing for inter-individual differences in peak responses. 
In the case of null-results in our group-level univariate Traits > Neutral analysis, we 
would use functional localiser data to define seed regions within the body and ToM networks. 
These seed regions will include right EBA and FBA for the body-localiser, and bilateral TPJ, 
bilateral temporal poles (TP), mPFC, and Precuneus for the ToM-localiser. Volumes were 
generated using a 6 mm sphere, which was positioned on each individual’s seed-region peak. 
To identify seed-region peaks within localiser data, we would use results from prior studies 
using the identical localiser tasks to guide selection (Dodell-Feder et al., 2011; Downing & 
Peelen, 2011; Downing et al., 2007; Saxe & Kanwiser, 2003). PPI analyses were run for all 
seed regions that were identified. 
PPI models for each participant included the 3 regressors from the univariate analyses 
as covariates of no interest, as well as 4 PPI regressors. PPI regressors included one for the 
Traits and one for the Neutral condition, one for the Starter blocks, and one that modelled 
seed region activity (Figure 2A). The latter two regressors (starter blocks and seed region 
activity) are modelled as covariates of no interest. 
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To create the PPI regressors, the time series in the seed region was specified as the 
first eigenvariate, and was consequently deconvolved to estimate the underlying neural 
activity (Gitelman et al. 2003). Then, the deconvolved time series was multiplied by the 
predicted, pre-convolved time series of each of the three regressors (Traits, Neutral, and 
Starter). The resulting PPI for each condition in terms of predicted “neural” activity was then 
convolved with the canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF) and the time series of 
the seed region as covariates of no interest (McLaren et al. 2012; Spunt and Lieberman 2012; 
Klapper et al. 2014). Then, the same contrast as in the univariate analyses (Traits > Neutral) 
was evaluated for each participant individually (first-level), and then for the group (second-
level). 
For group-level analyses, images were thresholded using a voxel-level threshold of 
p<.001, a voxel-extent (k) of 10 voxels and a family-wise error (FWE) correction for multiple 
comparisons (p<.05). Based on our hypotheses for functional connections between core and 
extended body perception networks, we inclusively mask the contrasts from the main task by 
body and ToM localisers (Bodies>Cars and False Beliefs>False Photographs thresholded at 
p<.001, k=10). Inclusive masking in this manner makes sure that only body-selective areas 
and areas involved in mentalizing are shown. For completeness, we also report results from 
whole-brain analyses. To localise functional responses we used the anatomy toolbox 
(Eickhoff et al. 2005). 
 
Results 
Behavioural data 
Pilot data. Replicating prior findings (Mitchell et al. 2004; Gilron and Gutchess 
2012), results from the pilot experiment showed that approximately 8 minutes after encoding 
information recognition performance for traits and neutral bodies was above chance-level 
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(Traits: M=64.60%, CI.95 [61.98, 67.21], Cohen’s dz=1.28; Neutral: M=60.74%, CI.95 
[58.48, 63.01], Cohen’s dz=1.09). In addition, recall of trait information was superior to 
neutral information (Mean difference=3.85%, CI.95 [1.41, 6.30], Cohen’s dz=0.36), but there 
was little difference between recall of positive and negative trait knowledge with 95% 
confidence intervals overlapping with zero (Positive: M=64.17%; Negative: M=66.83%; 
Mean difference= -2.66%, CI.95 [-5.71, 0.40], Cohen’s dz=-0.20). These pilot data are 
illustrated in Supplementary Figure 1 and demonstrate that shortly after the encoding phase 
(approximately 8 minutes afterwards), participants can accurately remember information for 
close to 2/3 of the bodies that they were shown during the recognition phase. These results 
provide confidence that during scanning, which also took place shortly after the encoding 
phase (approximately 5 minutes after encoding), a majority of bodies were accurately 
remembered as being previously associated with social or non-social information. Further, the 
results provide empirical justification for collapsing positive and negative social knowledge 
into one ‘Traits’ condition as both types of trait knowledge were recalled to a similar level. 
Post-scanning data. After scanning, approximately 90 minutes after encoding, 
recognition performance was at chance for both trait and neutral bodies (Traits: M=49.70%, 
CI.95 [47.47, 51.94], Cohen’s dz=-0.05; Neutral: M=50.97%, CI.95 [48.32, 53.62], Cohen’s 
dz=0.15). There was also no difference between Traits and Neutral (Mean difference=-1.27%, 
CI.95 [-5.30, 5.74], Cohen’s dz=0.13). Compared to the pilot data, which were collected 8 
minutes after encoding, the post-scanning data were collected 90 minutes after encoding. As 
such, we suggest that reduced recall performance during the post-scanning recognition phase 
most likely reflects deterioration of recall performance over time (Supplementary Figure 1). 
 
Neuroimaging data 
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Functional localiser analyses: Group average MNI coordinates across participants are 
reported in square brackets. For the Bodies > Cars contrast based on the body-localiser data, 
clusters were revealed in right EBA for all 24 participants [54,-70,4], and in right FBA for 16 
participants [51,-40,-23]. For the False Beliefs > False Photographs contrast based on the 
ToM-localiser data, clusters were revealed in right TPJ [60,-58,25] for 20 participants, in left 
TPJ [-45,-64,28], left temporal pole [-51,5,-32], Precuneus [-9,-49,34], and mPFC [6,56,28] 
for 19 participants, and in right temporal pole [51,5,-32] for 18 participants (see 
Supplementary Table 1 for additional details). Data across both runs of the ToM-localiser 
were removed for 3 participants due to excess head movement. For these three participants, 
the group average MNI coordinate was used to define each ToM seed region. 
Main task univariate analyses: The Traits > Neutral contrast revealed no 
suprathreshold clusters when masked by either the body or the ToM localiser. Even at an 
uncorrected threshold, no clusters emerged within the body or ToM network. 
Psychophysiological Interaction analyses: We hypothesized that body-selective areas 
would interact with parts of the ToM-network. To test this hypothesis, we used seed regions 
that were defined by functional localiser data. 
For body-selective seed regions (right EBA and FBA), we tested for connectivity with 
the ToM-network that was stronger when observing bodies associated with trait-based than 
neutral information. No suprathreshold clusters emerged from these analyses. 
ToM seed regions (bilateral temporal poles and TPJ, Precuneus, and mPFC) were 
hypothesised to be functionally connected with body-selective areas. Left temporal pole 
showed greater coupling with right EBA when observing bodies associated with trait-based 
than neutral information (Figure 2B; Table 1). When inclusively masked by the body 
localiser, the response in right EBA survived FWE correction for multiple comparisons at the 
peak level (p = .009) and was at a borderline significance value at the cluster level (p = .06). 
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At the whole-brain analysis level, only one cluster emerged, which had a peak in right EBA 
and extended into occipitoparietal cortex (Table 1). No other regions in the ToM network 
were coupled with body patches. To test the possibility that the result in right EBA was driven 
by group membership, we evaluated the social knowledge (traits vs. neutral) by group 
membership (in-group vs. out-group) interaction for the left temporal pole seed region. The 
social knowledge by group interaction [(Traits_In-group > Neutral_In-Group) > (Traits_Out-
Group > Neutral_Out-Group)], as well as the inverse contrast, revealed no suprathreshold 
clusters when masked by either the body or the ToM localiser. Therefore, we are confident 
that the relationship between temporal pole and EBA is tied to the recall of social knowledge 
from bodies in a manner independent of group bias. 
 
 
Discussion 
The neuroscience of social cognition has largely focussed on identifying segregated neural 
circuits that process distinct aspects of cognition with less attention focussing on how 
integration between circuits contributes to perception and cognition (Adolphs 2009). Here we 
show that neural networks that have previously been associated with distinct functions, such 
as person recognition and trait inference (van Overwalle 2009; Kanwisher 2010), also 
cooperate when social inferences are prompted by person recognition. Prior work has that 
associating traits with bodily features involves functional coupling between neural circuits 
underpinning body perception and ToM (Greven et al., 2016). The current study extends this 
work to show how recall of social knowledge, which is prompted by recognising bodily 
features, is supported by functional integration between body circuits and the ToM network. 
Using functional connectivity analyses, we demonstrate that a node in the ventral visual 
stream that selectively responds to images of bodies (right EBA) is functionally linked with a 
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node within the ToM network (left temporal pole). The exchange of signals is specifically tied 
to seeing others that prompts the recall of social knowledge: functional coupling is greater 
when the observed person has been associated with trait-based information (e.g., “She gave 
money to charity”) than with neutral information (e.g., “He put a bowl in the cupboard”). 
These data extend previous work by showing how integration of neural signals, rather than 
segregation, contributes to social perception. 
 
Neural network integration during person perception 
Greven and colleagues (2016) showed functional interplay between FBA and temporal poles 
when forming links between physical features and social knowledge, whereas the current 
study shows that EBA and temporal poles interact when recalling stored knowledge based on 
physical features. The temporal poles have previously been associated with binding complex 
information from different modalities together (Olson et al. 2007, 2013), as well as retrieving 
social knowledge (Simmons and Martin 2009; Simmons et al. 2010; Drane et al. 2013). 
Considered together, functional connectivity data across two fMRI studies shows evidence for 
interplay and partnership between temporal poles and body-selective cortex. That is, the 
temporal poles do not act alone during the formation and recall of social knowledge; rather, 
they interact with perceptual input. These findings provide neurobiological evidence in favour 
of the view that understanding the visual environment involves dynamic interplay between 
conceptual knowledge and perceptual processing (Collins and Olson 2014a). Indeed, by 
measuring the magnitude of BOLD response, prior neuroimaging research has implicated 
body perception and ToM networks with linking together facial features with social 
knowledge (Todorov et al. 2007; Vrtička et al. 2009; Bayliss et al. 2012). Here, we extend the 
understanding of person perception by showing that a node within what is commonly 
considered a perceptual circuit serves to exchange signals via longer-range connections with a 
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node in a largely inferential circuit. We suggest that longer-range connections provide an 
interface between perceptual and inferential processing components, which enables recall of 
stored social knowledge triggered by the physical features of a person. 
The results from Greven and colleagues’ (2016) study as well as the current study 
highlight possible divisions in how nodes within social circuits are coupled during social 
perception. The temporal poles link differently with EBA and FBA, depending on whether 
traits are being associated in a novel manner (Greven et al., 2016), or recalled from memory 
as in the current study. It is possible that when linking physical and trait characteristics 
together (Greven et al., 2016), interactions between the temporal poles and FBA provide a 
holistic representation of the person’s identity, which is consistent with the proposed 
functionality of FBA (Peelen and Downing 2005; Taylor et al. 2007; Brandman and Yovel 
2016). By contrast, when participants are asked to form impressions based on what they have 
associated with each body previously as in the current study, identification may take place at 
the earliest possible opportunity and thus not require holistic processing of identity in FBA, 
but instead focus more on body-part processing in EBA (Peelen and Downing 2007; Urgesi et 
al. 2007; Pitcher et al. 2009). Thus, the relationship between EBA and left temporal pole 
would index early identification of bodily features, which trigger recall of stored social 
knowledge in left temporal pole. These suggestions, however, remain highly speculative and 
an important avenue for future research will be to test for possible functional divisions in the 
way the body perception and ToM networks interact with each other. For example, methods 
such as dynamic causal modelling (DCM), which estimate the direction of influence between 
regions, would be important (Friston et al. 2003; Stephan and Friston 2010; Vossel et al., 
2012). DCM relies on Bayesian statistics rather than a correlational approach, which allows 
the estimated evidence for different models of brain function to be compared. Using these 
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methods, the suggestions made above regarding functional specificity and the direction of 
influence between person perception and ToM networks could be directly tested. 
 
Towards a network model of social perception  
Network theory is a framework in which to study organisational structure of complex 
systems, which is founded on understanding relations between interacting parts (Bullmore 
and Sporns 2009; Meunier et al. 2010; Sporns 2010; Bassett and Gazzaniga 2011; Wig et al. 
2011). Based on network theory, future work may aim to distinguish between signals that 
integrate across components from those that reflect local processing within a component 
(Sporns 2013). Moreover, in many different types of network (biological, social, artificial), 
complex networks have common features such as ‘hubs’ and a ‘rich club’ of commonly 
connected circuits, and links between networks can have direction, valence and a particular 
weight of influence (Wig et al. 2011). Applying network theory to the study of brain 
organisation is a challenging prospect theoretically and empirically (Bassett and Gazzaniga 
2011), but it may hold promise for a richer understanding of social perception. For instance, if 
the temporal poles act as a ‘hub’ of social knowledge, which can link with different 
perceptual inputs (faces, bodies, voices), network theory may provide a rich foundation to 
empirically test this hypothesis. 
 
Limitations and future directions 
Pilot data suggest that during scanning, recall accuracy was above chance-level performance, 
but far from perfect (approximately 60-66% accurate). Therefore, our results are likely to 
underestimate the strength of relationship between the body and ToM networks since 
approximately 1/3 of trials may not have been remembered accurately. Unlike some studies 
(Todorov et al. 2007; Vrtička et al. 2009; Gilron and Gutchess 2012), we cannot separate 
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trials where information was recalled accurately and compare it to trials where it was 
inaccurate because the study was not designed to address this question. However, our best 
estimate is that the majority of trials in a block were remembered accurately. Therefore, any 
block comparisons would be biased more by correct than incorrect trials. Future work would 
be more sensitive to detect a wider range of effects if a greater proportion of trials could 
contribute to the contrast of interest. 
In the current study, univariate analyses show no differences between traits and 
neutral information and we only find one connection between body perception and ToM 
networks that shows a modulation by social inference (Traits > Neutral). There are at least 
two ways to consider this combined pattern of univariate and connectivity results and future 
research will have to tease them apart by running further experiments. First, it could reflect 
functional specialisation. That is, recall of social knowledge prompted by body perception is 
primarily subserved by functional links between right EBA and left temporal pole. A weaker 
inference along the same lines would be that the link between right EBA and left temporal 
pole is the only effect that is detectable with our design but other functional connections may 
also support the same cognitive process. Alternatively, it could reflect a Type-1 error or false 
positive. The result does survive correction for multiple comparisons, which restricts the 
likelihood of false positives (Eklund et al. 2016), but nonetheless the result could still reflect a 
false positive. Future research and particularly meta-analyses will be the best way to 
determine the most robust estimate of the effect (Cumming 2014). 
Finally, functional connectivity analyses provide no direct insight into the underlying 
neural pathways that control functional coupling between brain areas. Further investigation 
into anatomical connections such as those linking the ventral visual stream to the anterior 
temporal lobes (Collins and Olson 2014b), would complement and inform the current results. 
In addition, as the architecture of the neural network underpinning social perception becomes 
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clearer, models of directional influence can be tested using appropriate analytical tools 
(Friston 2009). Such future approaches would allow further development of Haxby and 
colleague’s model of person perception (Haxby et al. 2000) by providing a richer 
understanding of the links between the many processing components of person perception. 
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Table 1. Clusters revealed in the PsychoPhysiological Interaction (PPI) analysis for the Traits 
> Neutral contrast in the whole-brain analysis as well as masked by the body-localiser. 
Seed region is defined by the ToM-localiser (False Beliefs > False Photographs). 
Region Number 
of voxels 
Family-wise error 
corrected p value 
T Montreal Neurological 
Institute coordinates 
 
Cluster Peak x y z  
Seed region: left temporal pole  
Whole-brain analysis 
Right middle occipitotemporal 
cortex extending into 
occipitoparietal cortex 
177 .001 .09 5.75 39 -64 -2  
.60 4.48 30 -82 13  
.64 4.43 39 -73 -2  
Masked by body-localiser 
Right middle occipitotemporal 
cortex (EBA) 
44 .06 .009 5.75 39 -64 -2  
.45 3.63 45 -55 -14  
Note: Regions surviving a voxel-level threshold of p<.001 and 10 voxels are reported. 
Subclusters at least 8 mm from the main peak are listed. The seed region left temporal pole 
met these criteria. No other seed regions from the ToM localiser showed suprathreshold 
clusters. 
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Supplementary Table 1. Number of participants showing results within each region of the body-localiser (right extrastriate and fusiform body 
area; EBA and FBA) and ToM-localiser (bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), temporal poles (TP), Precuneus, and medial Prefrontal Cortex 
(mPFC)). Further details are provided on the mean coordinate, and the standard deviation from the mean coordinate for x, y, and z separately. 
 Body-localiser ToM-localiser 
EBA FBA TPJ TP Precuneus mPFC 
Number of 
participants 
 
Left 
24/24 16/24 
19/21 19/21 
19/21 19/21 
Right 20/21 18/21 
Mean coordinate 
Left 
54,-70,4 51,-40,-23 
-45,-64,28 -51,5,-32 
-9,-49,34 6,56,28 
Right 60,-58,25 51,5,-32 
SD coordinate 
X 4.18 2.45 L=7.03; R=5.80 L=6.60; R=4.73 7.09 7.99 
Y 5.34 4.51 L=5.65; R=6.28 L=6.44; R=5.57 6.47 6.84 
Z 5.38 5.11 L=7.55; R=8.05 L=7.35; R=7.056 6.68 17.04 
 
Note: For the Theory-of-mind (ToM) localiser, data for three participants were removed due to excess head motion. 
 34 
 
 
Figure 1. Methods and procedure for the fMRI experiment. A) In the encoding task, a variety 
of bodies were paired with statements conveying social knowledge (positive, negative, or 
neutral). Participants were instructed to form an impression of these people. B) In the main 
task of the fMRI experiment, participants observed blocks of bodies that had previously been 
paired with trait-based (positive or negative) or neutral statements. The bodies were presented 
on their own (without the statement) and participants were instructed to form an impression of 
each body based on what they had previously learned about them. For the univariate and 
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psychophysiological interaction (PPI) analyses, blocks with positive and negative bodies were 
combined into one regressor to compare Trait-based to Neutral bodies. 
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Figure 2. PsychoPhysiological Interactions (PPI) matrix and results. A) An illustration of the 
design matrix (this was the same for each run), that was created for each participant. B) The 
“psychological” (task) and “physiological” (time course from seed region) inputs for the PPI 
analysis and its results. The PPI parameter estimates are extracted from a 4 mm sphere around 
the peak coordinate. Seed region left temporal pole showed greater functional coupling with 
right extrastriate body area (EBA) when recalling traits about bodies (shown in red). These 
areas overlapped with the body-localiser (shown in green; overlap is shown in yellow). 
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Supplementary Figure 1. Behavioural results for the pilot and fMRI experiments separately. 
The recognition task in the pilot experiment was performed 8 minutes after encoding, while 
the encoding and recognition tasks in the fMRI experiment were separated by 90 minutes 
during which they performed various other tasks. The recognition after the fMRI experiment 
is at chance-level, which likely reflects a deterioration of recall performance over time. 
